

**TEXT OF A LECTURE DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR TY BURATAI (LT GENERAL RETIRED AND FORMER COAS, NA) AT THE 17<sup>TH</sup> SECURITY WATCH AFRICA AWARDS BANJUL GAMBIA ON 9 NOVEMBER 2022**

Protocols

*“Future civil wars will take the form of a government pitted against a private extra-legal military grouping. They will variously be called rebels, terrorists, freedom fighters, or gangsters, but their essential characteristics will be the same. These wars will also be a throwback, but to a very different period: the time before nation states cohered.”-* Professor Paul Collier of Oxford University in ***Wars, Guns, and Votes***

**INTRODUCTION**

1. I am truly honoured to be here, and I would like to express my deepest gratitude to ***Security Watch Africa*** for organizing this event and being consistent with the ideals of excellence, patriotism and professionalism in service delivery over the years. It is for this reason that I gladly honoured the invitation and agreed to personally serve as guest speaker today.

2. I have remain consistent in all my recent lectures and paper presentations that we now live in a VUCA world. When I say VUCA, V-U-C-A, I mean to say that our world today is Volatile, full of Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity. The theme of this event is ***POST COVID-19: SUSTAINING PEACE IN AFRICA***. Since it started, the uncertainty and novelty of the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) have been the two most interesting things about it. This showed how COVID-19 is pushing humanity toward a "historical divide" between before and after COVID-19, where the future is unknown and unpredictable. This reminds me of Donald Rumsfeld, former Defense Secretary of the United States who went further to say that uncertainty can be categorized into two: *known and unknown uncertainty*. He argued that while known unknowns may be significant, it is the unknown unknowns that will prove the most challenging. Thank God and science that the world has been able to

defeat COVID-19 but we should be on our guard for similar pandemics in the future. To this end, I want to commend the African Union for elevating the African Center for Disease Control and Prevention from a specialized technical institution to a public health agency with regional collaborative centers. This Center will help Africa in tackling future epidemics and will support African countries to develop homegrown solutions to solve our peculiar public health challenges. Already we have seen the kind of giant strides recorded by countries like Senegal in developing their own vaccines to cure COVID-19. Despite having 14% of the world's population, Africa produces less than 0.1% of the vaccines according to WHO. This is most unfortunate. Senegal is now developing Africa's first vaccine manufacturing cluster to produce Covid-19 and other vaccines. European and U.S governments and institutions are helping to finance the \$200m manufacturing hub and the plant will produce 25m vaccine doses a month. The organizers of this event asked me to speak on **COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND COUNTER TERRORISM: CAUSES, CHALLENGES, LESSONS AND DETERRENCE**. I understand that this is primarily an award ceremony where imminent personalities who distinguished themselves in their careers and fields are going to be honoured so I will try to suit my lecture to fit with the ambiance of the day.

3. We begin with the logic of Donald Rumsfeld and his categorization of uncertainties; his argument that while known unknowns may be significant, it is the unknown unknowns that will prove the most challenging. These two uncertainties – known and unknown unknowns – largely define the sectoral discussion of uncertainty. Therefore I want to present this short lecture on the premise that the world but especially Africa should brace up for VUCA conditions, and plan ahead before things get out of hand. This is why I must commend **Security Watch Africa** because they did not just ask me to tap on my experience in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations to speak on the causes, challenges, lessons of insurgency and terrorism but also on DETERRENCE.

4. This topic is timely because we have witnessed cases of insurgency and terrorism in not only Somalia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Libya but also counties like Mozambique, Togo,

Benin, Uganda and Burkina Faso. Terrorists cost Africa billions of dollars annually. This amount will only increase now that the newest African affiliate of the Islamic State has derailed the continent's greatest private investment. In April, the French oil giant Total declared force majeure on a \$20 billion liquefied natural gas project in northern Mozambique due to a growing conflict linked to the Islamic State. The cost of terrorism in Africa increased from \$1.54 billion in 2007 to \$15.5 billion in 2016 because of Total's exit<sup>1</sup>. Money that should be supporting economic progress and better governance for millions is instead lost to destructive insurgencies and pocketed by global terrorists. Tunisia's tourism revenues shrank by 35 percent following terror attacks in 2015, undermining a major economic sector for two years. A 2019 UN study found that foreign direct investment in a group of 18 African countries affected by terrorism fell by 43% from 2007 to 2016. In the same UN study, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) had a \$312.7 billion effect on the economies of the 18 countries affected by terrorism over a 10-year period. This did not include the effects on the economies of the countries where the refugees went or on the economies of international donors. In West Africa alone, a record 29 million people required humanitarian aid last year. So Distinguished invitees, ladies and gentlemen, this topic is apt.

## **DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS**

5. Allow me to start by giving us the definition of some key terms in today's lecture. I will start by defining insurgency "as the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region<sup>2</sup>." Insurgency is usually an intrastate conflict that some scholars say it is also politics but by means of arms conflict<sup>3</sup>. Now counterinsurgency or in short COIN is simply a whole of government approach, strategy and method to counter it. On the other hand, "terrorism is the unlawful use of violence or the threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological

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<sup>1</sup> See *The economic cost of terrorism in Africa* by Emily Estelle. Available at <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-economic-cost-of-terrorism-in-africa>

<sup>2</sup> US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 25 April 2018, p. ix.

<sup>3</sup> Austin Long defines insurgency as "the use of political and military means by irregular forces to change an existing political order."

beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political. “It is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. Most insurgent groups use terrorism as a tactic in pursuit of their goal<sup>4</sup>.” Terrorism always relies on a cocktail of four things: a terrorist group, vulnerable individuals, social support and a terrorist ideology. The group adheres to or develops an ideology that it then uses to convince its adherents that terrorism is justified. It can serve as a potent tool of irregular warfare. Counterterrorism is the approach, strategy and method to counter it. “Counterterrorism activities and operations are what a government does to neutralize terrorists, their organizations and networks. The common denominator for most insurgent groups is their objective of gaining control of a population or a particular territory, including its resources. This objective differentiates insurgent groups from purely terrorist organizations<sup>5</sup>.” There is a small difference between insurgents and terrorists although I see them as two sides of same coin. Insurgents need the support of the people, but terrorists are either single people or small groups or cells without wide support from the public<sup>6</sup>. In addition, the difference between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism is that "hearts and minds" or the “carrot and stick” are needed for COIN but counterterrorism is usually based on search-and-arrest-or-destroying tactics of the enemy that do not hurt the campaign. Insurgents and terrorists find it easy to succeed because it is easy to destroy a thing than to build or protect it. The terrorists usually require a few AK-47s, some IEDs and a band of frustrated and disgruntled people who are instructed on basics of guerilla using the works of Sun Tzu. They follow no rules of engagement and they are not party to any international treaty. Most importantly, they believe that they are fighting for God, which makes some of them willing to die for their cause.

## **THE CAUSES**

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<sup>4</sup> See *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency* 2012

<sup>5</sup> *ibid*

<sup>6</sup> Boyle, M., ‘Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Go Together?’ *International Affairs*, 36(2), 2010.

6. Insurgents want to cut the ties between the people and the government. They use "hit-and-run" tactics and acts of urban terrorism and other forms of "asymmetric warfare" to reach this goal but why do they do that? What are the causes? Although there is a slight difference between an insurgent and a terrorist, the causes for both are usually the same or they overlap. Many people in both the media and the academia said that poverty, injustice, bad governance, ignorance and religious extremism are the major causes of insurgency and terrorism but I believe there is more to it. An international psychologist, Dr. Anne Speckhard wrote a captivating book titled ***Talking to Terrorists: Understanding the Psycho-Social Motivations of Militant Jihadi Terrorists, Mass Hostage Takers, Suicide Bombers and Martyrs*** that I believe is worth quoting here. "No one is born a terrorist. But we must remember that even for those persons, individuals who become terrorists are always seduced into and move along a terrorist trajectory that takes advantage of their individual vulnerabilities and receptiveness to the terrorists ideology and group. These susceptibilities become motivations for terrorism, I learned from my extensive studies, can and often do include personal traumatization, deep traumatic bereavement, anger, a desire for revenge, heightened sensitivity to the suffering of others, humiliation, frustrated aspirations, social alienation, marginalization, secondary trauma, a desire to prove one's manhood, to belong, to protect others, to have an adventure or to be a hero."

## **CHALLENGES**

7. Salafi-jihadi groups are starting to step up their attacks along the northern borders of a number of Gulf of Guinea states. These attacks may be a sign that militants with ties to al-Qaeda want to bring their territorial insurgency to these countries. This would be part of a long-term move south in West Africa. The second attack against security forces in northern Togo since November 2021 was carried out by Salafi-jihadi extremists.<sup>7</sup> Both assaults were probably carried out by *Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen* (JNIM), an affiliate of Al Qaeda in the Sahel. On May 10-11, over 60 militants


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<sup>7</sup> See ***Examining Extremism: Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin*** by Jared Thompson. Available at <https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-jamaat-nasr-al-islam-wal-muslimin>

briefly took control of a Togolese base in Kpinkankandi, northern Togo, killing 8 and injuring 13. Salafi-jihadi organizations utilized Benin and Togo to get supplies but may now be attacking. JNIM<sup>8</sup> and other Salafi-jihadi groups have used Gulf of Guinea border areas, especially Benin, Ghana, and Togo, to source motorcycles, basic items, ammunition, and money in recent years. JNIM and IS Sahel Province oversee local supply lines from W-Arly-Pendjari Park Complex in the Burkina Faso-Benin-Nigeria tri-border region. Salafi-jihadi organizations utilized Benin and Togo to get supplies but may now be attacking. The recent victory the Taliban secured in Afghanistan had emboldened al Shabab and we are now witnessing renewed vicious attacks over Mogadishu and its environs. Therefore the challenge to lives and properties of Africans, the worsening situation of the displacement of women and children, and most worrisome the furtherance of the yardstick of underdevelopment in the continent will continue.

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<sup>8</sup> Galula, David, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 1964.



Source: The salafi-Jihadi Movement in Africa: July 2022 CT AEI

Figure 1: **This map shows the threat of insurgency and terrorism in Africa. One out of every three countries in Africa is either facing Active insurgency or Low-level insurgency. Five countries in West Africa are under Active Insurgency, and Nigeria is surrounded by countries that are either under Active Insurgency or Low Level insurgency.**

In my view, another major challenge confronting the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa, and this may likely continue for some time if we do not take proactive measures, is the issue of hostage taking for ransom by jihadi and other related militant groups. These insurgents and terrorists see hostage taking as a means to extract money from government, local and international organizations and even ordinary citizens who are struggling to survive. It is an irony that the insurgents and terrorists now compel locals to fund their criminal activities through ransom payment. For example, the *Daily Trust*, a

Nigerian national daily reported that the criminals made about N2 billion from the Kaduna-Abuja train hostages. The story is the same in Niger Republic where Chinese nationals were abducted for ransom. If Africa truly wants to succeed in its counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts, something drastically must be done about hostage taking and ransom payment. It must to stop.

8. I also believe that funding counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations is also a challenge for Africa. Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations require huge investments and most African nations do not have that capacity. Africa cannot afford to have another wave of intractable war that will stagnate development and divert the resources the continent has into arms procurement. Already the Russians are in many countries of Africa (Libya, Sudan, Mozambique, Madagascar, Central African Republic, and Mali) focusing principally on protecting the ruling or emerging governing elites and critical infrastructures, and I can tell you that they are not there for charity; they get paid in money and in most cases concessions to minerals and military bases. Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations are draining our meagre resources. We cannot afford to allow these Jihadi terrorists to continue with their mission.

9. According to a recent document released by the Office of Joe Biden known as US Strategy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa, one-quarter of the world's population by 2050 will be in Africa, and that if the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is implemented, Africa will be the fifth largest economy in the world with a combined GDP of \$3.4 trillion. The major challenge before us is that insurgency and terrorism will constitute an obstacle to the stability and economic development of Africa. This hydra-headed monster called terrorism is menacingly staring us in the face, and it is high time we came up with a foolproof, homegrown solution anchored on and around-the-clock effort to confront and mitigate this challenge.

## **LESSONS**



10. I believe that my experience as Chief of Army Staff of the Nigerian Army and also as a diplomat who served in one of the member countries of the Multi National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of which I also serve as Force Commander, there are lessons that we can learn from counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in Sub Saharan Africa especially within the Nigerian context. But I will not limit my scope to Africa or Nigeria; I will draw lessons from places like Colombia (FACR).

11. The first lesson for us is to know that guns and bullet alone cannot defeat insurgency and terrorism if we do not make concerted effort to address the root causes of the problem. Other institutions of government must address causes like anger, a desire for revenge, heightened sensitivity to the suffering of others, humiliation, frustrated aspirations, social alienation, marginalization and joblessness. If these root causes are not addressed, they will continue to serve as reference points for the leaders of insurgencies to delegitimize constituted authorities and encourage gullible masses to rise up against the government in the name of fighting injustice and wickedness. This is why good governance is key to every counterinsurgency operation.

12. Secondly, and let me categorically make it clear that I am in no way trying to defend or shield the military, other security agencies and government institutions need to be actively involved in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. For example, the civil police in Africa is the main security agency charged with the duty of maintaining internal security but because of numerosity of challenges, it is finding it difficult to lead. Not only the police, other government institutions need also to be up and doing. For example in Nigeria, the National Agency for Nomadic Education is charged with the responsibility of providing basic education to nomads but over the years, this agency has failed to perform its responsibility. This has contributed to the rising number of out of school children in Nigeria.


13. I have also learnt that it is better for the military to focus its efforts not only on winning hearts and minds, but also on acquiring

information from the people about insurgent and terrorists' activities. When satisfied with government security and services, civilians supply information. With information, counter-insurgent operations can dismantle insurgent networks. Without it, insurgencies fester and violence increases. The part played by the media in COIN operations is closely related to this. I must be clear that the media is essential to the survival of all terrorist organizations. I agree that the media has a duty to educate the people of what is happening, but when reports on insurrection and terrorism take over our TV newscasts and the front pages of our national dailies and magazines, I will say something is amiss since this should not be the case. I must praise Security Watch Africa at this point for their fair-minded, impartial reporting and patriotic outlook.

14. Intelligence is essential to all counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in the contemporary world. As the then Chief of Army Staff of the Nigerian Army, I made intelligence acquisition and sharing a major priority, to the point where I am sometimes physically involved due to my familiarity with the geography and local languages. I give preference to tips from local citizens. These impacts did not involve winning hearts and minds; only tips were necessary. This is achievable because I revitalized and realigned the Army to gain the allegiance of the populace through costly population protection and development. There is no gainsaying the fact that 'intelligence dominance' is an important deterrent in COIN operations. Intelligence dominance alludes to terrorists' belief that the opposing state has superior intelligence capabilities and can thus target them at will. The US government has succeeded in constructing the image of an intelligence superpower on purpose. The mere belief that US has superior intelligence capabilities is a deterrence mechanism to its enemies.

15. Another lesson in counterinsurgency from Iraq according to ***Small Wars, Big Data*** is that it is important to keep aid modest, secure, informed, and conditional. In Iraq, projects valued at less than \$50,000, guided by coalition experts who worked closely with the local community and conditional on the community's cooperation, reduced violence the most. The best projects focus on small, deliberate projects coordinated with military forces.

16. Professor Paul Collier of Oxford University talked about the economy of scale in violence; that criminal gangs know about this and that is why they always team up together to achieve maximum result in wreaking havoc. This is why I must use this opportunity to commend President Muhammadu Buhari for giving maximum support and financing the MNJTF, which I believe, is doing well in COIN. We need to understand that most insurgents and terrorists groups are not monolithic. For example, Boko Haram is not a single, unified group. It has split off into a number of smaller groups, some of which have made alliances with foreign Islamist groups like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Shabaab in Somalia. These alliances have helped radicalize the leadership of the main group. Estimates put the number of Boko Haram fighters between a few hundred and a few thousand. The group's organization has been called "diffuse," and this has become even truer since Yusuf's death. Another important thing that I must mention here today is the African Standby Force. Although it has been existing since 2003, the AU is now giving it teeth to ensure effective operation. The African Standby Force is now decentralized and co-ordinated at a regional level. I believe that when the African Standby Force starts full operation, it will go a long way in mitigating the challenges of insurgency and terrorism in Africa. We have seen the ineffectiveness of the MINUSMA UN stabilization mission in Mali and Burkina Faso. A Malian military government that seized power in August 2020 has no option but to turn to the Russians to help them prosecute their counterinsurgency operation. With access to uranium, diamond, and gold mines as likely payoffs, a 1,000-contractor-strong Wagner Group deployment was brought in to train the Malian soldiers and protect the country's government officials. Observers say that the Russians did not make any difference. If the African Standby Force is operational and well-funded and equipped, I do not think the Malian Military rulers will run to the Russians for help. It is high time African countries look inwards, cooperate and synergize together and come up with homegrown counterinsurgency solutions to tackle our peculiar challenges.



Source: Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, "Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 5 (2010): 651–660, doi:10.1177/0022343310378914; "The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project," ACLED, <https://acleddata.com/>.

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**Figure 2: The chart shows that JNIM is spreading fast in West Africa.**

17. Another lesson to share with you, distinguished invitees, ladies and gentlemen, is the unique importance of youths in the community. For us in Nigeria, the *Yan Gora* ("those who hold the stick"), or "Civilian JTFs," comprised of local militia formed by local populations in the places affected and under siege by the insurgency in reaction to escalating attacks. They have backed operations in Maiduguri since June 2013 and act as a local proxy force under the civil authorities, a source of intelligence, and both. These "Civilian JTFs" (CJTF) typically break into the homes of known and suspected Boko Haram members, cutting them to death or manhandling them before handing them over to the state authority. They were armed with machetes, axes, bows and arrows, clubs, swords, and daggers. The security situation in and around Maiduguri has much improved thanks to their help.

18. Colombia, which used to be at odds with the once-dangerous FARC terrorist organization, is now a reference point for defeating insurgency and building peace. A significant lesson we may draw from Columbia is the importance of strong and effective political leadership. Strong, effective leadership is required for victory in an

asymmetric conflict. Since the beginning of Uribe's administration in 2002, the choice of leaders who put audacious vision into action marked the turning point between stumbling along and advancing toward triumph in Colombia. There is little question that most of the progress made in Colombia between 2002 and 2013 was the direct result of great leadership. The current positive position in Colombia is largely attributable to the notion of establishing a crystal-clear grand vision and then holding people accountable at every level.

19. In Nigeria, we have also utilized the carrot-and-stick strategy, which is closely related to the issue of community engagement that I just mentioned. This was one of the techniques the Colombian government employed to destroy the FARC<sup>9</sup> terrorist organization. There are no military-only solutions for rescuing a country or area from the death cycle of violent extremism. As demonstrated by the Colombian experience, it is necessary to renounce the conventional military-centric approach as the only viable choice for insurgency and other asymmetric conflicts. Stability, political-economic-social development, rule of law, popular well-being, and lasting peace all depend on effective and legitimate control of the national territory, without disregarding the necessity of the use of armed force. For optimal effectiveness and legitimacy, a military-centric approach must be balanced with a population-centric approach.

## **DETERRENCE**

20. In my view, deterrence is the crux of this lecture because it is closely linked to prevention, and we all know preventing insurgents and terrorists from carrying out their nefarious activities is what we need in Africa now. Deterrence is the crime prevention effects of the threat of punishment. It is a theory of choice in which individuals balance the benefits and costs of crime. Daniel S. Nagin wrote a captivating essay titled ***Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century*** where he succinctly summarized the theory of deterrence where he postulated five things about deterrence. I will mention two of them here. He said that the certainty of being caught and punished and

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<sup>9</sup> See ***A Lessons From Colombia For Curtailing The Boko Haram Insurgency In Nigeria*** by Afeikhene Jerome. Available at [https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism\\_5-2/PRISM5-2\\_Lessons\\_From\\_Colombia\\_2015031902.pdf](https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_5-2/PRISM5-2_Lessons_From_Colombia_2015031902.pdf)

the perception that the police will catch criminals are two great deterrents among those who commit crimes. I submit to you that when insurgents and terrorists have the perception that our security is working so well that they will certainly be caught, a lot of them will not get involved in terrorism and other related criminal acts.

21. The theory of deterrence distinguishes between two types of deterrence. Deterrence by denial entails preventing a group from realizing its political goals, whereas deterrence by punishment entails the (partial) destruction of the group's political goals. Deterrence in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism involves working closely and effectively with other countries to see that, no terrorists' organization has a foothold or safe haven in any part of Africa. This can be done through diplomacy and development, actions and isolation; appeals to international law and where necessary, joint military action. The secret is to presume that there will always be threats by non-state actors like ISWAP and therefore take precautionary measures to see those who want to perpetuate the criminal act have a rethink because of its consequence. I have come to understand that it is far better to apply the denial aspect of deterrence than the punishment aspect.

22. During my tenure as Chief of Army Staff of the NA, I made it explicitly clear to insurgents and terrorists that there would be consequences after every attack or ambush on our troops or civilians. One of the strategies that insurgents use to survive is the admonition of Sun Tzu who said, "If weaker numerically, be capable of withdrawing. And if in all respects unequal, be capable of eluding him." As Army Chief, I made it difficult for the enemy to elude the troops so much that that alone became a deterrent to them because it is not just to carry out an ambush but how do they escape alive?

### **AFRICAN DILEMMA IN NEGLECT BY THE WEST**

23. Distinguished invitees, ladies and gentlemen, this is not the time to wine, complain, blame each other or look for sympathy from outside the shores of our continent. The African story, regardless of what is happening in some parts of the Sahel and Sub Saharan Africa

is not a story of failure and hopelessness, and our challenges are surmountable if we can buckle up, look inwards, take responsibility for our action and condition, and work together to salvage the continent. Two wars come into my mind as I conclude this speech—the Tigray/Ethiopian war, and that of Russia and Ukraine. By 14 August, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights had recorded 13,212 civilian casualties in Ukraine (5,514 killed and 7,698 injured). In Tigray, by contrast, **The Globe** and **Mail** in Canada reported in March that between 50,000 and 100,000 people had been killed, between 150,000 and 200,000 had died from starvation, and more than 100,000 had died through a lack of access to healthcare facilities. We can also see that the Western countries were receptive to war refugees from Ukraine despite the fact that they have frowned at African refugees coming to the West. Dr Adeoye O Akinola, Head of Research and teaching at the University of Johannesburg’s Institute for Pan-African Thought and Conversation, South Africa called this the “racialization of migration<sup>10</sup>.”

24. Another thing that is glaring when we take a look at the two wars is the level of financial support the West gave to Ethiopia vis-à-vis Ukraine. For instance, the United States, under President Joe Biden, has allocated about \$54-billion in aid and military equipment to Ukraine, while it has sent about \$488-million to help those suffering in the 18-month conflict in Ethiopia. Similarly, the United Kingdom has offered an estimated £2.3-billion in military support to Ukraine. This is in addition to the £1.5-billion in humanitarian and economic aid extended to the country since support to where they thought is in their interest. Nevertheless, I think this should be a lesson to African leaders. We must come up with innovative solutions to solve our security and economic challenges.

25. At this juncture, I want to call on all African leaders to observe the rule of law, strengthen our democracy and democratic institutions, run an all inclusive government and create an enabling environment that they can help our youths to create jobs through innovation. Finally, I am calling on all patrons and financiers of insurgencies and terrorists organizations in Africa to have a rethink

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<sup>10</sup> See <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-08-23-with-all-eyes-on-ukraine-where-is-the-world-and-africa-on-the-tigray-tragedy/>

and consider the consequences of the bloodletting they have brought upon Africa. Let them embrace dialogue, negotiation (as it was recently done by the Chadians), and democracy.

## **CONCLUSION**

26. Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, I believe that with this short talk, you will agree with me that the insurgency and terrorism are twin monsters that have been unleashed on Africa with devastating consequences on its development and progress. The causes, challenges and the lessons arising therefrom are multifaceted that would require multi-prong approach to tackling them. The African Union and the various regional organizations need to devote more time and resources towards addressing and finding African solutions. The over reliance on foreign aids and support need to be critically looked into. Africa cannot remain independent as long as it continues to rely on foreign support to do visually everything under the sun.

I thank you for your attention.

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